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Aesthetics, Aestheticians, and Critics 
Howard S. Becker 
Aesthetics as Activity 
Aestheticians study the premises and arguments 
people use to justify classifying things and activities as 
"beautiful," "artistic," "art," "not-art," "good art," 
"bad art," and so on. They construct systems with 
which to make and justify such classifications as well 
as specific instances of their application. Critics apply 
aesthetic systems to specific art works and arrive at 
judgments of their worth and explications of what 
gives them that worth. 
In this view aesthetics is an activity rather than a 
body of doctrine. Aestheticians are not the only people 
who engage in this activity. Most participants in art 
worlds make aesthetic judgments frequently. Aesthetic 
principles, arguments, and judgments make up an im-
portant part of the body of conventions by means of 
which members of art worlds act together. Creating an 
explicit aesthetic may precede, follow, or be simulta-
neous with developing the techniques, forms, and 
works which make up the art world's output, and it 
may be done by any of the participants in that world. 
Sometimes artists themselves formulate the aesthetic 
explicitly, although they often develop it only implicitly 
through their continuing, daily choices of materials 
and forms. 
In complex and highly developed art worlds, spe-
cialized professionals-critics and philosophers-
create logically organized and philosophically defen-
sible aesthetic systems, and the creation of aesthetic 
systems can become a major industry in its own right. 
An aesthetician whose language foreshadows a socio-
logically based system I will examine below describes 
what aestheticians do: 
Being a member of the Institution of Art ... does not pre-
suppose any explicit knowledge of the constitutional and 
regulative rules of the Institution. To find and formulate 
these is the job of a special kind of officers of the Institu-
tion , the aestheticians or philosophers of art, at least if 
aesthetics is conceived in the modern way as the philo-
sophical discipline that deals with the concepts we use 
when we talk about, think about or in other ways "handle" 
works of art. On the basis of their own understanding of 
the Institution of Art as a whole, it is the task of aestheti-
cians to analyze the ways all the different persons and 
groups talk and act as members of the Institution, and 
through this to see which are the actual rules that make up 
the logical framework of the Institution and according to 
which the procedures within the Institution take place .... 
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Howard S. Becker is Professor of Sociology and Ur-
ban Affairs at Northwestern University. His recent 
work has focused on the use of photography in social 
science, visual sociology, and the sociology of art. 
Within the Institution of Art specific statements of 
fact- results of a correctly performed elucidation and in-
terpretation of a work of art, say-entail specific evalua-
tions. Consitutive rules lay down specific criteria of evalu-
ation that are binding for members of the Institution. 
[Kj0rup 1976:4 7 -48] 
We need not believe that it works so neatly to see that 
art world participants understand the role of aestheti-
cians and aesthetics this way. 
An art world has many uses for an explicit aesthetic 
system. It ties the activities of participants to the tradi-
tion of the art, justifying their demands for there-
sources and advantages ordinarily available to people 
who produce that kind of art. To be specific, if I can ar-
gue cogently that jazz merits as serious consideration 
on aesthetic grounds as other forms of art music, then 
as a jazz player I can compete for grants and fellow-
ships from the National Endowment for the Arts and 
faculty positions in music schools, perform in the same 
halls as symphony orchestras, and require the same 
attention to the nuances of my work as the most ''seri-
ous'' classical composer or performer. An aesthetic 
shows that, on general grounds successfully argued to 
be valid, what art world members do belongs to the 
same class as other activities already enjoying the ad-
vantages of being "art." 
A well-argued and successfully defended aesthetic 
also guides working participants in the production of 
specific art works. Among the things they keep in mind 
in making the innumerable small decisions that cumu-
latively shape the work are whether and how those de-
cisions might be defended on general grounds. Of 
course, working artists do not refer every small prob-
lem to its most general philosophical grounding to de-
cide how to deal with it, but they know when their deci-
sions run afoul of such theories, if only through a 
vague sense of something "wrong." A general aes-
thetic comes into play more explicitly when someone 
suggests a major change in conventional practice. If, 
as a jazz player, I want to give up the conventional 
twelve- and thirty-two bar formats in which improvising 
has traditionally taken place in favor of those in which 
the length of phrases and sections is among the ele-
ments to be improvised, then I need a defensible ex-
planation of why such a change should be made. 
A coherent and defensible aesthetic, further, can 
help stabilize values and thus regularize practice. Sta-
bilizing value is not just a philosophical exercise; I am 
not talking about value in the ordinary sociological 
sense, but rather about attributes and objects people 
find valuable. Art world participants who agree on a 
work's value can act toward it in roughly similar ways. 
An aesthetic providing a basis on which people can 
assign the same value to things in a reliable and de-
pendable way makes regular patterns of cooperation 
possible. When values are stable, and can be de-
pended on to be stable, other things stabilize as well: 
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the monetary value of works and thus the business ar-
rangements on which the art world runs, the reputa-
tions of artists and collectors, and the worth of institu-
tional and personal collec~ions. The aesthetic created 
by aestheticians justifies the selections of collectors 
by providing a theoretical rationale for their activity. 
From this point of view, aesthetic value arises out of 
a consensus of the participants in an art world. With-
out that consensus, or just to the degree that one does 
not exist, value does not exist in any sociologically 
meaningful sense. (By this I do not suggest a sociolog-
ical imperialism over theories of value, but rather the 
notion that judgments ot value not held jointly by mem-
bers of an art world cannot provide the basis for col-
lective activity which assumes those judgments, and 
thus do not affect their activities significantly, if at all.) 
A work is deemed good, therefore valuable, through 
the achievement of consensus about the basis on 
which it is to be judged and through the application of 
the agreed-on aesthetic principles to the particular 
case. 
But many styles and schools compete for attention 
within an organized art world, demanding that their 
works be shown, published, or performed in place of 
those produced by adherents of other styles and 
schools. Since the art world's distribution system has 
a finite capacity, all works and schools cannot be pre-
sented by it and thus be eligible for the rewards and 
advantages of presentation. Groups compete for ac-
cess to those rewards, among other ways, by logical 
argument proving why they merit presentation. Logical 
analysis seldom settles arguments over the allocation 
of resources, but participants in art worlds, and espe-
cially the people who control access to distribution 
channels, often feel that what they do must be logically 
defensible. The heat arising in discussions of aesthet-
ics usually occurs because what is being decided is 
not only an abstract philosophical question but also an 
, allocation of valuable resources. Whether jazz is 
''really'' music or photography ''really'' art, whether 
free-form jazz is "really" jazz and therefore music or 
fashion photographs are "really" photography and 
therefore art are in part discussions about whether 
people who play free-form jazz can perform in jazz 
, clubs for the already existing jazz audience and 
whether fashion photographs can be exhibited and 
sold in important galleries and museums. 
Aestheticians, then, provide that element in the 
battle for recognition of particular styles and schools 
which consists of making the arguments to convince 
1 other participants in an art world that the work de-
l serves, on logically argued grounds, inclusion within 
, whatever categories that world concerns itself with. 
· The co •• servatism of art worlds, arising out of the way 
( conventional practices cluster in neatly meshed pack-
< ages of mutually adjusted activities, materials, and 
1 places, means that changes will not find an easy re-
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ception. Most changes proposed to participants in art 
worlds are minor, leaving untouched most of the ways 
things are conventionally done. The world of sym-
phonic music, for instance, has not changed the length 
of concert programs very much in recent years, for the 
very good reason that, because of union agreements, 
it would increase their costs to lengthen the programs 
and, because audiences expect eighty or ninety min-
utes of music for the price of a ticket, they dare not 
shorten them very much. (That was not always the 
case. Probably as a result of the unionization of musi-
cians, among other things, concert programs have 
shortened appreciably since, say, Beethoven's time, 
when one concert, for instance, contained two sym-
phonies, a piqno concerto, a concert aria and duet for 
voices, and a period of Beethoven ·improvising on the 
piano [Forbes 1970:255].) Nor has the basic instru-
mentation of the orchestra changed, nor have the tonal 
materials used (i.e., the conventional tempered chro-
matic scale), nor the places in which the music is pre-
sented. Because of all these conservative pressures, 
someone must make a strong argument if some sub-
stantially new practice, even a minor one, is to infil-
trate an existing art world. 
Readers of aesthetic works cannot fail to notice the 
moralistic tone of the writing. Aestheticians take it for 
granted that their job is to find a foolproof formula by 
which things which do not deserve to be called art are 
weeded out from the works which have earned that 
honorific title. I emphasize "deserve" and "earn" be-
cause aesthetic writing insists on a real moral differ-
ence between art and not-art. Aestheticians do not in-
tend simply to classify things into useful categories, as 
we might classify species of plants, but rather to sepa-
rate the deserving from the undeserving, and to do it 
definitively. They do not want to take an inclusive ap-
proach to art, counting in everything that might con-
ceivably add interest or value; they take an ex-
clusionary position, rather, looking for a defensible 
line of reasoning to validate the omission of unworthy 
work. The nature of the enterprise-the bestowing of 
honorific titles-requires them to rule some things out, 
for there is no special honor in a title every conceiv-
able object or activity is entitled to. Since bestowing 
the title "art" involves moral elements, aestheticians 
emphasize a foolproof formula; ideally, there should 
be no ambiguous cases. That aesthetic positions fre-
quently emerge in the course of fighting for the ac-
ceptance of something new does not alter the situa-
tion. Such positions, too, need to show that some 
things are not-art in order to justify the claim that 
something else is. Aesthetics which declare that 
everything is art do not satisfy people who create or 
use them in the life of an art world. 
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Aesthetics and Organization 
The rest of what aestheticians and critics do is to pro-
vide a running revision of the value-creating theory, 
which, in the form of criticism, continuously adapts the 
premises of the theory to the works artists actually 
produce. Artists produce new work in resp~nse not 
only to the considerations of for~al ae~thet1cs but ~l~o 
to the traditions of the art worlds 1n wh1ch they partiCI-
pate-traditions profitably viewed (Kuble~ 196~) as se-
quences of problem definitions and solut1o~~; 1n re- . 
sponse to suggestions implicit in other tra?1t~ons~ as 1n 
the influence of African art on Western pa1ntmg; 1n re-
sponse to the possibilities contained in new technical 
developments; and so on. But an existing aesthetic 
needs to be kept up to date so that it continues to vali-
date logically what has become important art work in 
the experience of audiences, and thus keeping the 
connection between what has already been validated 
and what is now being proposed alive and consistent. 
Since aesthetic principles and systems are part of 
the package of interdependent practices that make up 
an art world, they will both influence and be influenced 
by such aspects of it as the organization of training of 
potential artists and viewers, the organization of finan-
cial and other modes of support, and the modes of dis-
tribution and presentation of works. They will espe-
cially be influenced by a strain toward consistency that 
is implicit in the idea of "art." 
''Art'' is too crude a concept to capture what is at 
work in these situations. Like other complex concepts, 
it really is a generalization about the nature of reality, 
although somewhat disguised. When we try to define 
it, we find many anomalous cases-cases which meet 
some, but not all, of the criteria implied or expressed 
by the concept. In the case of art, we usually mean 
and understand something like this, at a minimum: a 
work possessed of aesthetic value, however that is de-
fined; a work justified by a coherent and defensible 
aesthetic; a work recognized by appropriate people as 
having that kind of value; a work displayed in appropri-
ate places (hung in museums, played at concerts). In 
many instances, however, works have some, but not 
all, of these attributes. They are exhibited and valued 
but either do not have aesthetic value or have aes-
thetic value but are not exhibited and valued by the 
right people. The concept of art suggests that we will 
find all these things co-occuring in the real world; 
when they do not co-occur we have the definitional 
troubles which have always plagued the concept of 
art. I will return to this problem later when I consider 
the institutional theory of art. 
One reason for the mutual influence between aes-
thetic theories and the organizations that make up an 
art world is that some people in art worlds try to mini-
mize these inconsistencies by bringing theory and 
practice into line so that there are fewer anomalous 
cases; others, who wish to upset the status quo, of 
course insist on the anomalies. To illustrate the point, 
consider this question: How many great (or excellent 
or good) works of art are there? I myself am not con-
cerned with fixing a number, nor do I think that the 
number (however we might calculate it) is important. 
But looking at that question will make clear those influ-
ences. 
In 1975, Bill Arnold organized "The Bus Show," an 
exhibition of photographs to be displayed on 500 New 
York City buses (Carlson and Arnold 1978). He in-
tended by this means ''to present excellent photo-
graphs in a public space'' and thus to a much larger 
audience than it ordinarly reaches and to allow many 
more photographers' work to be seen than would ordi-
narily be the case. The photographs were to be dis-
played in the space ordinarily used for advertising; to 
fill the advertising space on one bus required seven-
teen photographs of varying sizes, from nine to sixteen 
inches in height. To fill 500 buses thus required 8,500 
photographs. Arnold intended all of them to be current 
work by contemporary photographers. 
Are there actually 8,500 ''excellent'' contemporary 
photographs which merit that kind of public display? 
Asking that question presupposes an aesthetic and a 
critical position from which we could evaluate photo-
graphs, deciding which ones were or were not of suffi-
ciently high quality. Without attempting to specify the 
content of such an aesthetic, imagine a simplified 
case. Suppose that quality is a unidimensional attrib-
ute so that we can rank all photographs as having 
more or less of it. (In reality, we would find that com-
petent members of the art photography world, even 
those who belong to onaof its many competing seg-
ments, use a large and varied assortment of dimen-
sions in judging photographs.) We can then easily tell 
whether any photograph is better, worse, or equal to 
any other. But we would still not know how many of 
them were worthy of public display, how many merited 
being called "great" or "excellent" or "beautiful," 
and how many were worth being included in a museum 
collection or listed in a comprehensive history of art 
photography. 
To make those judgments requires establishing a 
necessarily arbitrary cutoff point. Even if we decide 
that a substantial "break" at some point in an other-
wise smooth distribution makes it easy to see a major 
difference on either side of it, to use such a break as 
the cutting point would be practically justifiable but 
logically arbitrary. But aesthetic systems propose and 
justify such judgments and divisions of existing art 
works all the time. In fact, the ''Bus Show'' shocked 
people by its implication that the line could justifiably 
be drawn where it would have to be drawn in order to 
fill all 500 buses, and not where it would be more con-
ventionally drawn (if we wanted to have a show of the 
best in contemporary photography, we would find our-
Aesthetics, Aestheticians, and Critics 
selves including, if we followed current museum prac-
tice, between 100 and 200 prints). 
If aesthetic systems justify dividing art works into 
those worthy of djsplay or performance and those not, 
that will influence and be influenced by the institutions 
and organizations in which such displays and perform-
ances occur. Institutions have some flexibility in the 
amount of work they can present to the public, but not 
much. Existing facilities (concert halls, art galleries 
and museums, libraries) have finite amounts of space; 
existing canons of taste limit the use to which that 
space can be put (we no longer feel it appropriate to 
hang paintings floor to ceiling in the manner of the 
Paris Salon); and audience expectations and conven-
tionalized attention spans impose further limits (more 
music could be performed if audiences were used to 
sitting through six-hour instead of two-hour concerts, 
although the financial problems, given current union 
wage scales, would make that impossible anyway). 
Existing facilities can always be expanded, but at any 
particular time there is only so much space or time, 
and only so many works can therefore be displayed. 
The aesthetic of the world which has such facilities 
at its disposal can fix the point on our hypothetical one 
dimension of quality so as to produce just the number 
of works for which there is exhibition space. It can fix 
the standard so that there are fewer works to be dis-
played or rewarded than there is room for (something 
of this sort happens when a prize-awarding committee 
decides that no work is worthy of a prize that year). Or 
it can fix the standard so that many more works are 
judged adequate than there is room for. Either of the 
latter two situations produces difficulties, throwing into 
doubt the adequacy of the art world's institutional ap-
paratus, the validity of its aesthetic, or both. There is, 
thus, some pressure for the aesthetic to operate on a 
standard flexible enough to produce approximately the 
amount of work for which the organizations have room 
and, conversely, for the institutions to generate the 
amount of exhibition opportunity required by the works 
the aesthetic certifies as being of the appropriate qual-
ity. These numbers come into further rough agreement 
when artists devote themselves to work for which there 
is room, withdrawing their effort from media and for-
mats which are ''filled up.'' 
When new styles of art emerge they compete for 
available space, in part by proposing new aesthetic 
standards according to which their work merits space 
in existing facilities. They also create new facilities for 
display, as in the c~se of the "Bus Show." Art worlds 
differ in their flexibility, in the ease with which they can 
enlarge the number of works which can easily be 
made available for public inspection in conventional 
facilities. Modern societies have relatively little trouble 
accommodating vast amounts of printed material in li-
braries (although not in easily accessible bookstores 
[Newman 1973]). Music can similarly be distributed in 
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recorded performances in large amounts. But live per-
formances of musical works of various kinds have so 
few outlets that it becomes reasonable for people to 
begin to compose music solely for recording, even to 
the extent of relying on effects which cannot be pro-
duced live, but require the mechanisms of an elabo-
rately outfitted recording studio. 
If aesthetic systems in fact move flexibly so as to 
continue to have the relationship I have just described 
with the mechanisms of distribution which characterize 
an art world, then even the most absolute of them, 
those which most resolutely draw a strict line between 
"art" and "not-art," have in practice a kind of relativ-
ism which defeats that aim. The problem so created is 
spoken to in an interesting way by the institutional the-
ory of aesthetics. 
An Institutional Theory of Aesthetics 
This paper, focusing as it does on questions of social 
organization, does not attempt to develop a sociologi-
cally based theory of aesthetics. In fact, from the per-
spective just sketched of the role of aesthetics in art 
worlds, it is clear that an aesthetic developed in the 
world of sociology would be an idle exercise, since 
only aesthetics developed in connection with the oper-
ations of art worlds are likely to have much influence in 
them. (See Gans 197 4 for an interesting attempt by a 
sociologist to develop an aesthetic, especially in rela-
tion to the question of the aesthetic value of mass me-
dia works.) Ironically enough, a number of philosphers 
have produced a theory that, if not sociological, is suf-
ficiently based on sociological considerations to let us 
see what such an aesthetic might look like. Worth in-
spection on that account alone, analysis of its prem-
ises and of the problems that have arisen in con-
nection with it will also clarify some issues considered 
earlier. 
Textbooks in aesthetics typically distinguish and 
describe several differing, sometimes contradictory, 
theories by which one can decide what is art, what is 
not, what is beautiful, what is not. The coexistence of 
these theories in the texts is not at all surprising, in-
dicating that no one has demonstrated finally, to uni-
versal satisfaction, a foolproof way of making those 
distinctions and that aesthetic theories, like ethical 
theories, continue to be debated. We might expect 
what is roughly true, that new theories-rivaling, ex-
tending, or amending previous ones-arise when 
older theories fail to give an adequate account of the 
virtues of some work which has been widely accepted 
by knowledgeable members of the relevant art world. 
When an aesthetic theory cannot legitimate logically 
what is already legitimate in other ways, someone will 
construct the theory that does legitimate it. (What I say 
here should be understood as pseudohistory, in-
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dicating in a narrative form some relationships which 
may or may not have arisen exactly as I say they did.) 
Thus, putting it crudely, for a long time works of vi-
sual art could be judged on the basis of an imitation 
theory, according to which the object of visual art was 
to imitate nature. At some point that theory no longer 
explained well-regarded new works of art-Monet's 
haystacks and cathedrals, for instance, even if they 
were rationalized as experiments in capturing the rela-
tionship between light and color, or Van Gogh's late 
works. A theory of art as expression then found the vir-
tues of works to reside in their ability to express and 
communicate the emotions, ideas, and personalities of 
the artists who made them. That theory in turn had to 
be repaired or replaced so that it might deal with geo-
metric abstraction, action painting, and other works 
that could not be understood in those terms-just as 
neither theory nor their analogs would be able to say 
anything useful about aleatory music, for instance. 
The institutional theory aims to solve the problems 
raised by works that outrage both commonsense and 
finer sensibilities by showing no trace of the artist at 
all, either in skill or intention. Institutional theorists 
concern themselves with works like the urinal or the 
snow shovel exhibited by Marcel Duchamp, their only 
claim to being art apparently lying in Duchamp's sig-
nature on them, or the Brillo boxes constructed and 
exhibited by Andy Warhol. The commonsense critique 
of these works is that anyone could have done them, 
that they require no skill or insight, that they do not im-
itate anything in nature because they are nature, that 
they do not express anything interesting because they 
are no more than commonplace objects. The critique 
of those with finer sensibilities is much the same. 
Nevertheless, those very works gained great re-
nown in the world of contemporary visual art, inspiring 
many more works like them. Confronted by this fait ac-
compli, aestheticians acted boldly to develop a theory 
that placed the artistic character and quality of the 
work outside the physical art object itself. They found 
those qualities, instead, in the relation of the objects to 
an existing art world, to those institutions and organi-
zations in which art was produced, distributed, appre-
ciated, and discussed. 
Arthur Danto and George Dickie have presented the 
most important statements of this theory. Danto con-
cerned himself with the essence of art, with what in the 
relation between object and art world made that object 
art. In his famous statement of the problem, he said: 
To see something as art requires something the eye can-
not descry-an atmosphere of artistic theory, a knowledge 
of the history of art: an artworld. [Danto 1964:580] 
The theory out of which the idea of making the Brillo 
box arose, the relation of that idea to other ideas about 
what makes art works art and to other objects those 
works inspired-all of these create a context in which 
the making of the Brillo box and the box itself become 
art exactly because that context gives them that sort of 
meaning. In another version: 
The moment something is considered an artwork, it be-
comes subject to an interpretation. It owes its existence as 
an artwork to this, and when its claim to art is defeated, it 
loses its interpretation and becomes a mere thing. The in-
terpretation is in some measure a function of the -artistic 
context of the work: it means something different depend-
ing on its art-historical location, its antecedents, and the 
like. And as an artwork, finally, it acquires a structure 
which an object photographically similar to it is simply 
disqualified from sustaining if it is a real thing. Art exists in 
an atmosphere of interpretation and an artwork is thus a 
vehicle of interpretation. [Danto 1973:15] 
Dickie deals with the organizational forms and 
mechanisms. According to his perfected definition: 
A work of art in the classificatory sense is (1) an artifact, 
(2) a set of the aspects of which has had conferred upon it 
the status of candidate for appreciation by some person or 
persons acting on behalf of a certain social institution (the 
artworld). [Dickie 1975:34] 
A sizable and interesting secondary literature has 
grown up around this point of view, criticizing and am-
plifying it (Cohen 1973; Sclafani 1973a and b; Blizek 
197 4; Danto 197 4; Mitias 1975; Silvers 1976). Sociol-
ogists will undoubtedly see a family resemblance be-
tween the institutional theory of art and the various so-
ciological theories that make their subject matter the 
way social definitions create reality (e.g., the so-called 
labeling theory of deviance), for both make the charac-
ter of their subject matter depend on the way people 
acting collectively define that character. 
There is a difference, however, and not a surprising 
one. Philosophers tend to argue from hypothetical ex-
amples and with stripped-down references to reality. 
Thus, the '' artworld'' referred to by Dickie and Dan to 
does not have a great deal of meat on its bones, only 
what is minimally necessary to make the points they 
want to make, and the criticisms made of their posi-
tions do not make much reference to the character of 
existing art worlds or ones which have existed, but 
rather to matters of logical consistency in the con-
structs used in the theory. None of the participants in 
these discussions develop as organizationally com-
plicated a conception of what an art world is as I have 
elsewhere (Becker 197 4, 1975, 1976, 1978, 1979), 
although I do not think my description is incompatible 
with their arguments. If we make use of a more ex-
tended and empirically based notion of what an art 
world is, however, we can make headway on some 
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problems the philosophical discussion has bogged 
down in, thus perhaps being helpful to aestheticians 
while simultaneously deepening our own analysis. 
Who? Who can confer on something the status of 
candidate for appreciation, and thus ratify it as art? 
What person or persons can act on behalf of that cer-
tain social institution, the art world? Dickie settles this 
question boldly. He describes the art world as having 
core personnel: 
... a loosely organized, but nevertheless related, set of 
persons including artists ... producers, museum direc-
tors, museum-goers, theater-goers, reporters for newspa-
pers, critics for publications of all sorts, art historians, art 
theorists, philosophers of art, and others. These are the 
people who keep the machinery of the artworld working 
and thereby provide for its continuing existence. [Dickie 
1975:35-36] 
But he also insists: 
In addition, every person who sees himself as a member of 
the artworld is thereby a member. [Ibid.] 
That last sentence, of course, alerts aestheticians; 
Dickie's approach will probably not satisfy their feeling 
that it is necessary to be able to distinguish the de-
serving from the undeserving and this definition is 
therefore going to be too broad. They cannot accept 
the implication of Dickie's remark, which is that the 
representatives of the art world who will be conferring 
the honorific status of art on objects are self-ap-
pointed, and express their discontent in a rash of hu-
morous examples. What if a zookeeper decides that he 
is a member of the art world and, in that capacity, con-
fers the status of candidate for appreciation, and thus 
of art work, on the elephant he tends? That could not 
really make the elephant a work of art, could it? Be-
cause, after all, the zookeeper really could not act on 
behalf of the art world, could he? We all know the an-
swers: The elephant just isn't an art work (Dickie 
1971; Blizek 197 4). 
But how do we know that? We know it because we 
have a commonsense understanding of the organiza-
tion of art worlds. A relevant feature of organized art 
worlds is that, however their position is justified, some 
people are commonly seen by many or most interested 
parties as being more entitled to speak on behalf of the 
art world than others; the entitlement stems from their 
being recognized by the other participants in the coop-
erative activities through which that world's works are 
produced and consumed as people who are entitled to 
do that. Whether other art world members accept 
these people as capable of deciding what art is be-
cause they have more experience, because they have 
an innate gift for recognizing art, or simply because 
they are, after all, the people who are in charge of 
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such things and therefore ought to know-whatever 
the reason, what gives them the ability to make the dis-
tinction and make it stick is that the other participants 
agree that they should be allowed to do it and that this 
agreement is one of the routine and interdependent 
activities that make up the art world. 
Sociological analysts need not decide who is enti-
tled to decide that things are art (or, to use Dickie's 
language, to confer the status of candidate for appre-
ciation). We need only observe which people members 
of the art world treat as capable of doing that and al-
low to do it, in the sense that once those people have 
decided something is art, the others act as though it 
were in whatever ways might be appropriate. 
Some common observations made in art worlds 
show that the philosophical desire to be able to make 
definitive distinctions between art and non-art objects 
cannot be satisfied by the institutional theory. For one 
thing, there is seldom complete agreement on who is 
entitled to speak on behalf of the art world as a whole. 
Some people occupy institutional positions which give 
them the de facto right to decide what will be accept-
able. Museum directors, for instance, had the power to 
decide whether photography was an art because they 
could decide whether or not to exhibit photographs in 
their museums. They even had the power to decide 
what kind of art (e.g., "minor" or whatever the oppo-
site of that is) photography was by deciding whether 
photographs would be exhibited in the main galleries 
in which paintings were ordinarily exhibited or whether 
they would be confined to a special place with less 
prestige in which only photographs were shown. But 
some people might argue that museum directors are 
incompetent to make the judgments they do make, that 
in a better world they would not be allowed to make 
such judgments because they are ignorant, prej-
udiced, and influenced by extraneous considerations. 
Some might think they are too avant-garde and do not 
give proper attention to established styles and genres; 
others, just the opposite (Haacke 1976, passim). 
Art world members also disagree over whether the 
decisions of occupants of certain positions really make 
any difference; this disagreement reflects their ambig-
uous position in the art world. It is frequently not clear 
whether a particular critic's decision has any con-
sequences or whether the activities of others will be 
conditioned by that decision; very often that will de-
pend on a variety of conting.encies arising from politi-
cal shifts and struggles within the art world. Insofar as 
art world members find this process ambiguous, the 
status of such people as critics, dealers, and members 
of prize and fellowship committees will likewise be am-
biguous, as will the status of whatever pronounce-
ments they make. The ambiguity is not remediable by 
philosophic or social analysis; it exists because the 
people whose deference would ratify the status defer 
sporadically and erratically. 
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Thus, we cannot make the an-or-nothing judgments 
aestheticians would like to make about whether works 
are or are not art. Since the degree of consensus 
about who can decide what art is will vary greatly from 
one situation to another, a realistic view reflects that 
uncertainty by allowing "art-ness," whether or not an 
object is art, to be a continuous variable rather than an 
all-or-nothing dichotomy. 
Similarly, we can see that art worlds vary in the 
kinds of activities carried on by their members that em-
body and ratify the assigning of the status of art to an 
object or event. On the one hand, material benefits, 
such as the award of fellowships, prizes, commissions, 
display space, and other exhibition opportunities (pub-
lication, production, etc.), have the immediate con-
sequence of helping the artist to continue producing 
work. On the other hand, such intangible benefits as 
being taken seriously by the more knowledgeable 
members of the art world have indirect but important 
consequences for artistic careers, placing the recipi-
ent in the flow of ideas in which change and develop-
ment take place in the world's concerns and providing 
day-to-day validation of work concerns and help with 
daily problems-rewards denied those who are merely 
successful in more conventional career terms. 
What? What characteristics must an object have to 
be a work of art? The institutional theory suggests that 
anything might be capable of appreciation. In fact, in 
response to a critic who says that some objects-
, 'ordinary thumbtacks, cheap white envelopes, the 
plastic forks given at some drive-in restaurants"- just 
cannot be appreciated (Cohen 1973: 78), Dickie says: 
But why cannot the ordinary qualities of Fountain [the uri-
nal Duchamp exhibited as a work of art]- its gleaming 
white surface, the depth revealed when it reflects images 
of surrounding objects, its pleasing oval shape- be appre-
ciated. It has qualities similar to those of works by Bran-
cusi and Moore which many do not balk at saying they ap-
preciate. Similarly, thumbtacks, envelopes, and plastic 
forks have qualities that can be appreciated if one makes 
the effort to focus attention on them. One of the values of 
photography is its ability to focus on and bring out the 
qualities of quite ordinary objects. And the same sort of 
thing can be done without the benefit of photography just 
by looking. [Dickie 1975: 42] 
Can anything at all be turned into art, just by some-
one's saying so? 
. . . it cannot be this simple: even if in the end it is suc-
cessful christening which makes an object art, not every 
attempt at christening is successful. There are bound to 
be conditions to be met both by the namer and the thing to 
be named, and if they are completely unsatisfied, then 
saying "I christen ... "will not be to christen. [Cohen 
1973: 80] 
Cohen is right: not every attempt to label something art 
is successful. But it does not follow that there are, ac-
cordingly, some constraints on the nature of the object 
or event itself which make certain objects ipso facto 
not art and incapable of being redefined in that way. 
The constraints that undoubtedly exist in any spe-
cific art world on what can be defined as art arise from 
a prior consensus on what kinds of standards will be 
applied, and by whom, in making those judgments. Art 
world members characteristically, despite all their doc-
trinal and other differences, produce quite reliable 
judgments about which artists and works are serious 
and therefore worthy of attention. Thus, jazz players 
who disagree over stylistic preferences can never-
theless agree on whether a given performer or per-
formance "swings," and theater people likewise make 
quite reliable judgments of whether a particular scene 
''works.'' Artists may disagree violently over which 
works and their makers should receive support, and 
marginal cases (especially those in styles just being in-
corporated into the conventional practice of the art 
world or those on the verge of being thrown out as no 
longer worthy of serious consideration) will provoke 
less reliable judgments. But most judgments are re-
liable, and that reliability reflects not the mouthing of 
already agreed-on judgments but rather the system-
atic application by trained and experienced members 
of the art world of similar standards; it is what Hume 
(1854) described in his essay on taste, and it is similar 
to the way a group of doctors, confronted with a set of 
clinical findings, will arrive at a similar diagnosis (anal-
ogies can be found in every area of specialized work). 
In that sense, not everything can be made into a 
work of art, just by definition or the creation of con-
sensus, for not everything will pass muster under cur-
rently accepted standards in the art world. But this 
does not mean that there is any more to making some-
thing art than, to use Cohen's term, christening it. It is 
also a matter of christening if the entire art world 
agrees on standards that, if they are automatically ap-
plied, some works clearly meet, so that their classifica-
tion as art is self-evident, and others as clearly fail to 
meet; the consensus arises because reasonable mem-
bers of the world will have no difficulty in classifying 
works under such circumstances. Constraints on what 
can be defined as art exist, but they constrain because 
of the conjunction of the characteristics of objects and 
the rules of classification current in the world in which 
they are proposed as art works . 
Further, those standards, being matters of con-
sensus, change. Much of the running dialogue of art-
ists and other participants in art worlds has to do with 
making day-to-day adjustments in the content and ap-
plication of standards of judgment. In the early 1 930s 
jazz players, critics, and aficionados all agreed that 
electrical instruments could not produce real music. 
Charlie Christian's performances on the electric guitar 
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convinced so many people that they were having the 
same sort of experience from his playing that they did 
from music played on a nonelectric instrument that the 
canon was quickly revised. 
How much? Aestheticians, both the institutionalists 
and their critics, worry about the effect of aesthetic 
theorizing on artists and art worlds. They express the 
fear, for instance, that an aesthetic theory which is too 
restrictive will be unnecessarily depressing to artists 
and might perhaps unduly constrict their creativity. 
This overestimates the degree to which art worlds take 
their direction from aesthetic theorizing; the influence 
probably runs in the other direction. But the institution-
alists draw one important implication from their analy-
sis: Practicing artists, if they want to have their work 
accepted as art, will have to persuade the appropriate 
people to certify what they have done as art. (While the 
basic institutional analysis suggests that anyone can 
do that, in practice these theorists accept the existing 
art world as the one which has to be persuaded to do 
the job.) But if art is what an art world ratifies as art, 
then I might suggest an alternative strategy, one I have 
analyzed in more detail elsewhere (Becker 1975, 
1979)-the strategy of organizing an art world de 
novo, which will then ratify as art what one produces. 
In fact, the strategy has been used often and with con-
siderable success. Others have tried it and failed, but 
that does not mean it is not a reasonable possibility. 
Several difficulties arise in creating a new art world 
to ratify work which has no home in already existing 
art worlds. Resources (especially financial support) 
will probably have been allocated to already existing 
artistic activities, so that one needs to develop new 
sources of support, new pools of personnel, and new 
sources of materials and other facilities (including 
space in which to perform and display works). Since 
existing aesthetic theories have not ratified the work, a 
new aesthetic must be developed and new modes of 
criticism and standards of judgment enunciated. To 
say that these things must be done, however, raises an 
interesting question of the definitional kind that philo-
sophical analysis provokes. How much of the appa-
ratus of an organized art world must be created before 
the work in question will be treated seriously by a 
larger audience than that supporting the original group 
that wanted to create the new world? What it takes to 
convince people will vary a great deal. Some will re-
quire an elaborate ideological explanation. Oth-
ers-theater managers, operators of recording stu-
dios, printers-will ask only for guarantees that their 
bills be paid. 
65 
This question need not, indeed should not, be an-
swered by enunciating criteria. Rather, we should real-
ize that the activities involved can be carried on by 
varying numbers of people, and without the full-blown 
institutional apparatus of such a well-equipped world 
as that, for instance, which surrounds contemporary 
sculpture and painting or symphonic music and grand 
opera. When we speak of art worlds, we usually have 
in mind these well-equipped ones, but in fact paint-
ings, books, music, and all sorts of artistic objects and 
performances can be produced without all the support 
personnel these worlds have and are dependent on: 
critics, impresarios, furnishers of materials and equip-
ment, providers of space, audiences. At an extreme, 
remember, any artistic activity can in principle be done 
by one person, who performs all the necessary activi-
ties (Becker 1976); this is not common and not a con-
dition many artists aspire to (though one they some-
times yearn for when they have trouble with their 
fellow participants). As the number of people involved 
grows, a point is reached at which some stable nu-
cleus of people cooperates regularly to produce the 
same sort of work; as the number grows larger than 
that, a point might be reached at which individual art-
ists can produce work for a large audience of people 
they do not know personally and still have a reason-
able expectation of being taken seriously. Call that 
first point of organization an esoteric world, and the 
latter an exoteric one. The names and cut-off points 
are not so important as the recognition that these are 
more or less arbitrary, the reality being a variety of 
points that vary along several continua. 
How many? Neither Dickie nor Danto is very clear 
as to how many art worlds there are . Dickie says: 
The artworld consists of a bundle of systems: theater, 
painting, sculpture, literature, music, and so on, each of 
which furnishes an institutional background for the confer-
ring of status on objects within its domain. No limit can be 
placed on the number of systems that can be brought un-
der the generic conception of art, and each of the major 
subsystems contains further subsystems. These features 
of the artworld provide the elasticity whereby creativity of 
even the most radical sort can be accommodated. A whole 
new system comparable to the theater, for example, could 
be added in one fell swoop. What is more likely is that a 
new subsystem would be added within a system. For ex-
ample, junk sculpture added within sculpture, happenings 
added within theater. Such additions might in time develop 
into full-blown systems. [Dickie 1975:33] 
Blizek (197 4) sees that there is an empirical question 
in this but also sees that the definition of '' artworld'' is 
so loose that it is not clear whether there is one art-
world, of which these are subparts, or a number of 
them, possibly unrelated; further, that if there are a 
number of artworlds they might conflict. Several ob-
servations are relevant here. 
66 studies in Visual Communication 
1 Empirically, we can see that not only are there the 
worlds of various art media, but that these may be sub-
divided at times into quite separate and almost non-
communicating segments. I have spoken of schools 
and styles as though they competed for the same re-
wards and audiences, but often they do not. Instead, 
members of one group develop audiences and other 
sources of support from sectors of society that would 
not have supported those other art world segments 
with whom they might compete. Thus, many painting 
worlds rely on the same suppliers as recognized con-
temporary artists for materials, but have quite sepa-
rate, and often very successful, arrangements for ex-
hibiting, distributing, and supporting their work. The 
Cowboy Artists of America, for instance, produce 
paintings for people who would like to buy works by 
Charles Russell and Frederick Remington, genre 
painters of the American cowboy West whose work is 
exhibited in "real" museums, but cannot afford them 
or cannot find any to buy: 
Despite determined inattention by Eastern art critics, cow-
boy painting and sculpture are so popular that their prices 
are inflating faster than intrastate natural gas. Cowboy art 
has its own heroes, its own galleries and even its own pub-
lishing house. [Lichtenstein 1977:41] 
Regional segments are not so isolated as this, tending 
to be oriented to the metropolitan centers of the "big" 
art world (McCall1977). Their participants suffer from 
a lack of exhibition opportunities but even more from 
the sense that success in their region will do them little 
or no good in the larger world they aspire to but which 
is almost totally unaware of them. 
2 If we define art worlds by the activities their partici-
pants carry on collectively (Becker 197 4), we can ap-
proach the problem of a general art world by asking 
what activities a general art world-one which encom-
passes all the conventional arts- might carry on col-
lectively in such a way that we might want to refer to it 
as one art world. I can think of two. On the one hand 
the various media-oriented subcommunities suffer ' 
from many of the same external problems. Thus, a de-
pression might make it harder for all the specific art 
forms to secure financial support (although the experi-
ence of the Great Depression in the United States 
does not wholly bear this out). A common situation is 
one in which the government imposes censorship on 
all the arts in a similar way, so that the experience of 
people in one arena can be read as a sign of what one 
can expect in another. Thus a theatrical designer 
might make his own professional decisions on the 
basis of what the censors might do about a play he is 
interested in, arriving at the assessment by hearing 
about what they have done about a recording by a 
popular singer, a recent novel, or a new film. Insofar as 
the participants in all these worlds share experiences, 
interpretations, and predictions vis-a-vis the censors, 
they might be said to be engaging in a form of collec-
tive activity and thus to constitute an art world. 
In another direction, artists in various media-
oriented worlds may find that they want to achieve sim-
ilar kinds of things in their work and share ideas and 
perspectives on how to accomplish that. For example, 
during periods of intense nationalism, many artists 
may see it as their job to somehow symbolize the char-
acter and aspirations of their country or people in the 
works they create. To do that, they have to find im-
agery and techniques which will convey the ideas and 
feelings they have in mind as well as finding the ideas 
and feelings themselves. Insofar as participants in var-
ious worlds debate these questions across media 
lines, they might be said to be participants in one gen-
eral art world. 
3 Particular artistic institutions often use people from 
other fields as support personnel for the work that is 
central in their own field. Thus, visual artists create 
settings for theatrical and dance performances, writers 
produce librettos for operas, musicians compose and 
play backgrounds for films, and so on. Insofar as these 
activities bring people together across subworld lines, 
they might be said to be participating in a general art 
world. Furthermore, because of these possibilities, 
people from worlds not already connected in this way 
may find it interesting to contemplate new forms of col-
laboration, thus creating further links in the general art 
world. Finally, participants in specific art worlds often 
come from a limited sector of the environing society, 
for instance, the educated upper middle class or petty 
aristocracy. They will thus have connections with eacn 
other by virtue of having attended school together or 
coming from families connected by kinship or friend-
ship, and these connections will serve to create a gen-
eral art world or, at least, to provide the basis in regu-
lar associations which might enable them to 
collaborate in the kinds of activities already men-
tioned. 
The analysis of this problem makes clear that 
speaking of art worlds means using shorthand. ''Art 
world," remember, is just a way of talking about 
people who participate in the making of art works in a 
routine way. The routine interaction is what constitutes 
the art world's existence, so questions of definition 
can generally be resolved by looking at who actually 
participates with whom in doing what. In that way, the 
logical and definitional problems of the institutional 
aesthetic theory (which has a strong empirical com-
ponent) can be resolved by knowledge of the facts of 
any particular case. 
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The institutional theory of aesthetics, as we have seen, 
itself illustrates the process analyzed in the first part of 
this paper. When an established aesthetic theory does 
not provide a logical and defensible legitimation of 
what artists are doing and, more important, what the 
other institutions of the art world-especially distribu-
tion organizations and audiences-accept as art and 
as excellent art, professional aestheticians will begin 
to provide the required new rationale. If they do not, 
someone else probably will, although the rest of the 
participants might just go ahead without a defensible 
rationale for their actions. (Whether one is required 
depends on the amount of controversy, engendered by 
what they are doing and what they are confronted 
with.) When earlier theories of art and beauty failed to 
explain or give a rationale for the enjoyment and cele-
bration of contemporary works widely regarded as ex-
cellent, given the amount of argument and competition 
for space and other resources and honors in the world 
of contemporary art, and given the number of profes-
sional philosophers who might find the problem in-
triguing, it was a certainty that something like the insti-
tutional theory would be produced. 
By shifting the locus of the definitional problem from 
something inherent in the object to some relation be-
tween the object and an entity called an art world, the 
institutional theory makes it once again possible for art 
world participants to find justification for their activi-
ties, and to be able to answer the kind of question lev-
eled at their work that is philosophically so distressing; 
that is, the question predicated on the failure to find 
any trace of skill or beauty, thought or emotion, in the 
works regarded as excellent, and the questions asking 
if the same works could not have been produced by a 
chimpanzee, a child, an insane person, or any ordinary 
member of the society without particular artistic talent. 
The latter example-that anyone could do it-is per-
haps the most damaging. It suggests that artists have 
no special gift or talent, and thus that the rationale for 
regarding them as special members of the art world (or 
the society), entitled by virtue of the display of that tal-
ent to special rewards, is fallacious. The institutional 
theory allows art world participants to define that spe-
cial talent in the new way, as, for example, the ability 
to invent imaginative new concepts, thereby conferring 
legitimacy on the artist's special role and rewards. 
Looking at the institutional theory adds some 
nuances to the description of art worlds. We see that 
art world officials have the power to legitimate work as 
art, but that power is often disputed, so that there is 
room for argument. As a result, the aesthetician's de-
sire for definitive criteria ·by which to distinguish art 
from non-art, insofar as those criteria might be found 
in or be expected to be congruent with the actions of 
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art world officials, cannot be satisfied. That is of some 
interest because aestheticians are not the only ones 
with such a desire. In fact, sociologists often insist that 
fields such as the sociology of art or religion or sci-
ence settle on some definitive criterion of their subject 
matter. If that criterion is expected to be congruent 
with either popular or official conceptions of art, the 
sociological wish for a definitive criterion is likewise 
unsatisfiable. 
We see too that, in principle, any kind of object or 
action can be legitimated as art, but that in practice 
every art world has procedures and rules for making 
those distinctions which, while not clearcut or fool-
proof, nevertheless make the success of some can-
didates for the status of art work very unlikely. Those 
procedures and rules are contained in the conventions 
and patterns of cooperation by which art worlds carry 
on their routine activities. 
Finally, we see how it might be possible to speak of 
all the arts as comprising one big art world. Insofar as 
members of specialized subworlds cooperate in some 
activities related to their work, that cooperative activ-
ity-be it vis-a-vis government censorship, the devel-
opment of nationalist art, or whatever-can be seen as 
the operation of one big art world. Such cooperation 
may be relatively uncommon, and probably is most of 
the time in any society, so that we might want to say 
that the operative art worlds are those of the particular 
media; but this question, like the others, is empirical, 
and its answer will be found by research. 
Note 
An earlier version of this paper was given at the Fifth Annual Conference 
on Social Theory and the Arts , Syracuse University) April 1978. It will 
appear in a slightly different form in my forthcoming book, Art Worlds 
(tentative title}, to be published by the University of California Press. 
Some ideas referred to briefly in this paper are explained more fully in 
Art Worlds , and in my earlier papers as noted in the text. 
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